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Abstract
This paper provides evidence that local social interactions within ethnic groups
may explain the puzzling variations in labour-market outcomes across individ-
uals. Peer effects work first by creating pressure on labor-market participa-
tion, second, by conveying information about job opportunities and by raising
wages. These effects differ through a selection effect: gender and ethnic groups
who are less integrated in the labour market benefit more from peer effect.
Finally, networks exhibit decreasing returns. The problems of endogeneity
and simultaneity of local peer effects are addressed by using (i) data aggre-
gated at the province level, (ii) the distribution of the sex of the peers’ siblings
as an instrumental variable and (iii) a quasi-panel data approach relying on
the Hausman-Taylor estimator. The importance of social interactions in the
labour market suggests that a social multiplier exists and our estimates show
that any labour-market shock is magnified with an elasticity of 0.5.
JEL classification: J15, J16, O18, Z13
Keywords: Peer effects, Development Economics, Labour, South Africa
Re´sume´
Les interactions sociales locales au sein des groupes ethniques peuvent nous
aider a` comprendre les variations inexplique´es des comportements individuels
sur le marche´ du travail. Les effets des pairs se pre´sentent de diffe´rentes ma-
nie`res : tout d’abord comme une norme sociale en termes de participation.
Deuxie`mement, les effets de pairs agissent comme un vecteur d’information
ame´liorant l’acce`s a` l’emploi et augmentant les salaires. Ces effets diffe`rent se-
lon le genre et l’origine ethnique des individus a` travers un effet de se´lection :
les groupes ethniques les moins inte´gre´es e´conomiquement be´ne´ficient plus des
effets de pairs. Enfin les rendements sont de´croissants. Les proble`mes d’endo-
ge´ne´ite´ et de simultane´ite´ des effets de pairs locaux sont traite´s en utilisant
(i) les donne´es agre´ge´es au niveau de la province, (ii) la re´partition du sexe
des enfants des pairs comme instrument et (iii) une approche en quasi-panel
fonde´e sur l’estimateur d’Hausman-Taylor. La pre´sence d’interactions sociales
sur le marche´ du travail implique l’existence d’un multiplicateur social : tout
choc sur le marche´ du travail est amplifie´ avec une e´lasticite´ de 0.5.
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1 Introduction
Although South Africa is an upper middle-income country, social indicators sug-
gest that living standards there are closer to those in low-income countries. The
country’s long history of segregation and discrimination is often appealed to as an
explanation for this gap between economic status and social development (Bhorat
et al. (2004)). In post-apartheid South Africa, the ethnic group to which individuals
belong plays a key role in labour-market behavior and outcomes (Keswell & Poswell
(2002), Kingdon & Knight (2004) and Cornwell & Inder (2008)).
In this context, this paper considers the following question: Do peer effects reduce
the gender and ethnic gap by improving the activity, the employment rate and wages
of the least integrated group? To deal with this question this paper analyses whether
peer behavior (i.e. behavior of neighbors speaking the same language) on the labour
market can predict individual labour-force participation, work and wages. Finally,
this paper studies the heterogeneity of this effect which is non-linear and group-
specific.
Our results show that being surrounded by active peers increases the probability
of participation. As the number of active peers increases, social pressure on the
inactive provides a greater incentive to participate in the labor market. Furthermore,
this effect is convex for men and concave for women: social pressure plays a role for
women even when there are relatively few active peers, whereas the analogous effect
for males is marginal. Along the same lines, being surrounded by employed peers
increases both the probability of employment and wages. This effect is concave for
both sexes, suggesting decreasing returns to networks. The wage effect confirms
that peer effects do not reflect shifts in the labor-supply curve. The results can
be interpreted in the framework of job-search theory, whereby employed peers act
as a network relaying information between members. This information is used to
improve the odds of finding a job. The wage effect suggests that networks are used
as a matching device. A decomposition of these peer effects by ethnic group reveals a
selection effect: the best-integrated groups1 in the labor market, namely Afrikaans-
and English-speaking individuals, are those who benefit the least from peer effects.
1Best integrated means overepresentation in the labor-force, i.e. the ratio ”‘% in the employed
population/% in the total population”’ > 1. See last column of Table 2
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Those with a locally well-integrated ethnic group do not rely on networks but rather
on market mechanisms. This suggests that peer and network effects may help to
reduce inequality.
A growing literature has focused on social interactions, networks and peer effects
as explanations for the puzzling variations in labor-market outcomes across workers,
time periods and areas (See for example Alesina et al. (2006)). The questions we
address here are important in a number of dimensions of development and economic
policy. If peer effects exist and are gender- and ethnic-specific, then policies for de-
velopment and poverty reduction will be affected. The existing literature on social
interactions has found evidence of a social multiplier (Glaeser et al. (2003)). This
latter describes the snowball effect which amplifies labor-market shocks via social
interactions. Individual decisions here depend both on the context (as predicted by
standard economic models) and on peers’ decisions. Labor-market inequality is a
major component of overall inequality between men and women and between ethnic
groups in South Africa (Bhorat et al. (2004)). In addition, the understanding the
effect of labor-market networks is arguably critical in developing countries where
market failures produce little information transmission. Especially in South Africa
characterized by high levels of unemployment (29% in 2008 World Bank), worker
discouragement (18% of inactive Kingdon & Knight (2000)) and relatively low ab-
sorption of the unemployed into the informal sector (Kingdon & Knight (2004)). It
suggests that individuals do not rely on market mechanisms to find a job. More-
over, job-search methods are predominantly passive, with most jobs being obtained
via word-of-mouth and other informal recruitment methods (Kingdon & Knight
(2000)). The South African National Income Dynamics Study (2008) provides some
information about the way in which individuals found their job, and confirms the
importance of networks: over 42% of respondents claim to have found their current
job via relatives or friends outside the household (See Appendix A).
In line with the theoretical work in Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al.
(1992), we assume that network effects on the labor market operate via an informa-
tion vector, as well as via the transmission of norms. This may first reflect social
pressure: those who are among the few unemployed in their group are stigmatized
(Clark (2003)), and thus have additional incentives to look for a job. Moreover,
4
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job offers may be obtained from direct and indirect acquaintances through word-
of-mouth communication (de Mart´ı & Zenou (2009)). By reducing employer uncer-
tainty about worker productivity, networks may enhance the match quality between
job candidates and the available jobs (Marsden & Gorman (2001)) and increase
wages. Calvo-Armengol & Jackson (2004) build a simple model of a labor-market
with networks. Agents randomly receive information about job opportunities. When
they hear about a vacant job, they may either keep the job information for them-
selves, or pass the information along to other agents to whom they are connected.
It has been shown that this suffices to generate a positive correlation between the
employment statuses of the agents who are connected in the network. Following
Granovetter (1974, 1995), the network is considered as a productive channel for job
finding. An alternative explanation relies on expectations. In the traditional job-
search literature, the decision to look for work is based on a cost-benefit analysis
taking into account the cost of looking for a job, the probability of finding a job and
the corresponding wage distribution. Such information is not readily available and
can be inferred from the observation of peer behavior and outcomes. If a substantial
proportion of the individual’s peers work, she might conclude that finding a job will
be easier than she had previously thought.2
The identification of peer influence on own labor-market decisions raises a number
of serious problems, due to endogeneity, simultaneity and reflection (Manski (1993)).
Social interactions simultaneously affect both the individual’s decisions and those of
other agents in the reference group (Sacerdote (2001)). In addition, individuals
select into peer groups based, in part, on their unobservable characteristics (Hoxby
(2000)). Individuals living in the same neighborhood or belonging to the same
ethnic group then tend to take similar decisions partly because they share the same
background and preferences. An OLS regression of individual behavior on the mean
of the endogenous variable is then unlikely to be informative about causal effects.
To avoid this worry, we add dummies for language group and area (Bertrand et al.
(2000)) and use a non-linear probit model (Araujo et al. (2004)). Moreover, we use
alternatively three identification strategies. First, the local measure of network is
replaced by an aggregated measure at the province level (Bertrand et al. (2000));
2See Chapter 8 of Jackson (2008) for a survey of learning in networks.
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second, the distribution of the sex of peers’ siblings is used as instrumental variable
(Maurin & Moschion (2009)); last, we adopt a quasi-panel approach (Graham &
Hahn (2005)).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 defines the peer group and its measure,
and Section 3 briefly presents the data. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy
and then Section 5 presents the empirical results. Last, Section 6 discusses the policy
implications and concludes.
2 Modeling Peer Effects
2.1 Peer Group Definition
South Africa is an interesting case for study as it has adopted a multilingual
language policy in order to ensure ease of communication. In the Constitution
the eleven official languages of the Republic are Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati,
Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Afrikaans, English, isiNdebele, isiXhosa and isiZulu. However,
this constitutional provision may encourage the strongest language, namely English,
which will then play a hegemonic role. Language usage tends confirm the practice of
English monolingualism: English is the language of cities, commerce and banking,
national government, road signs and most official documents. With respect to the
labor market, English appears to be the language of communication. The vast
majority of commercial and formal labor-market activities are in English, whereas
less than 8% of the population claims English as their mother-tongue or their home
language (Cornwell & Inder (2008)). One question is then whether this multilingual
policy produces a greater impact of labor-market peers for those who speak English
or for those who speak some other language.
One of the major concerns in the analysis of network effects is the identification
of who belongs to which network. Some datasets do contain direct information,
such as AddHealth in which we can identify each teenager’s best friends. Never-
theless, in general researchers are very often obliged to make assumptions about
plausible network membership. The most straightforward proxies for networks are
peer groups. Much work appeals to this strategy implicitly by mixing up the terms
“peers”, “friends”, “contacts” and “networks”.
6
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We here approximate networks by defining likely peer groups for each individual.
These peer groups are defined by area and ethnic membership. Defining peer effects
geographically is common in the literature and is justified on the ground that peer
effects mainly result from local social interactions. Maurin & Moschion (2009) argue
that social interactions in female labor supply pertain at the neighborhood level, and
find a considerable impact of close neighbors’ participation on individual labor-force
participation. A number of pieces of work have found that individual outcomes are
correlated with those of the individual’s neighbors.3 These local social interactions
via neighbors reflect the quality of information decaying with distance (de Mart´ı &
Zenou (2009)).
Fernandez & Fogli (2005) also emphasize the role of neighborhoods, and show
that ethnic groups tend to cluster in the same neighborhoods in the USA. They
suggest that in neighborhoods with a greater proportion of individuals of the same
ethnic group, there is a more pronounced transmission and maintenance of the norms
regarding the attitudes that women should have in the labor-market. Polarization
and hysteresis are therefore stronger in more segregated neighborhoods. Table 1
presents the maximum concentration rate for each language group, and reveals a
considerable correlation between ethnicity and geographical location in South Africa.
For each language group, there is one province with at least 31.08% (and at most
76.82%) of language peers.
[Table 1 about here]
An alternative to a geographical peer group is one based on ethnicity (Borjas
(1992, 1994, 1995)): empirical analyses along these lines have uncovered correlations
between individual and ethnic-group outcomes. In the South African context, Burns
et al. (2010), Hofmeyr (2010) suggest that social networks defined by ethnic groups
matter for labor-market outcomes. Bertrand et al. (2000) argue that the language
spoken at home is a good proxy for ethnic groups and that it make sense to define
peer groups as individuals in the neighborhood who speak the same language. This
argument is based on the following elements. First, there is a vast literature on
homophily, showing that people tend to form ties with other from the same demo-
3See Jencks & Mayer (1990) for a literature review.
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graphic group and, amongst other criteria, from the same ethnic group.4 If peers
are mainly drawn from the pool of individuals with the same ethnic origin, we will
have a good approximation of potential contacts by focusing on the ethnic group.
Second, it is a well-established fact that language is closely related to identity, and
especially ethnic identity (see Fishman (2001)), so that the language spoken at home
is a strong signal of ethnic membership, and more so than skin color or ethnicity.
We consider language spoken at home as an active belonging, while ancestry and
race are exogenous and do not suffice to determine ethnic identity (Alba (1990)).
Ethnic group linked by ancestry may include individuals who are only loosely con-
nected, and we assume that individuals partly reject their ethnic membership if they
do not speak the associated language at home. Moreover, Hofmeyr (2010) argues
that differences within race and ethnic groups prevent the sole use of geographical
information to identify networks: “a black South African who speaks IsiZulu does
not necessarily understand or associate with a black South African who speaks IsiX-
hosa even if they live in the same area”. Finally, we expect that information will
be more easily transmitted between individuals who speak the same language. We
assume that two people speaking the same language at home may exchange informa-
tion about job opportunities, although we thereby underestimate the true number
of potential contacts.
2.2 Network Measure
To measure the range and quality of the network, we follow Bertrand et al. (2000).
Our network variable is constructed by multiplying measures of the quality and size
of the network. In what follows, i indexes individuals, h households, a areas5 and l
ethnic groups defined by language spoken at home. Network quality is defined by
the proportion of peers (excluding the individual and household members) who are
currently active or working6: Lial. Let Lial be equal to one if individual i speaking
language l and living in area a is working. Thus:
4See for example Currarini et al. (2009), McPherson et al. (2001), Fong & Isajiw (2000) and
Baerveldt et al. (2004).
5Areas are magisterial districts divided between urban and rural areas.
6We use alternatively the proportion of peers who are currently active/working. Nevertheless,
our preferred specification uses active peers (working peers resp.) as network quality to estimate
the labor-market participation (the probability to be employed resp.).
8
 







where nal denotes the number of individuals of language group l in area a, and nh
the number of working-age individuals in household h. Individual i and household
h are excluded from the calculation of the mean, as Angrist & Pischke (2008) show
that spurious correlation may result when the mean of the endogenous variable is
used as an explanatory variable.7
We then construct a measure of the relative size of the network, which we call





with sal being the share of group l in area a and sl being that of group l in the
whole population. This is a proxy for the relative size of the pool of potential
contacts in the local area. For robustness check, we use the proportion of neighbors
speaking the same language at home. Our results are insensitive to this change. This
measure is preferred for its nice properties for identification issue and because small
ethnic groups are not underweight (Bertrand et al. (2000)). We will use the natural
logarithm of this measure to account for potential decreasing returns in the size of
the network: the more potential contacts you have, the less likely you are to exploit
the full benefits provided by each additional contact. We add one to this ratio to
ensure that the logarithm is always positive, which facilitates its interpretation.9
Our network measure is then:
Netwial = ln(CAal)× Li,al (1)
7If the individual is not excluded from the mean, the regression of Lial on Lial always has a
coefficient of 1 (See Angrist & Pischke (2008) for direct proof). If the household members are not
excluded, peer effects could be affected by intra-household decisions which refer to other issue like
substitutability and specialization.
8See for details Bertrand et al. (2000).
9If CA < 1, so that lnCA < 0, then the measure of network (i.e. lnCA∗L) decreases as average
employment in the neighborhood increases.
9
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3 Data
We use the 10 percent sample of the 2001 South African survey, yielding infor-
mation on 1,695,464 individuals aged between 16 and 65. This sample consists of
906,238 women (53.44 percent) and 789,706 men (46.56 percent). The census pro-
vides information about language spoken at home, which we use to proxy ethnic
membership.
There are four geographical levels in the census data: province, district council,
municipality and magisterial districts. There are nine provinces and 367 magisterial
districts in South Africa (See Appendix B). We use magisterial districts, the smallest
available geographical level, to define neighborhoods. We can only work with 278
of these districts as the smallest are grouped together in the database. We also
use information on area type: rural or urban. Considering rural and urban areas
as different geographical zones (in a given district), implies assuming that the peer
groups of rural inhabitants do not include urban inhabitants.10 Combined with the
11 language groups, we finally obtain 4,266 groups.11
We have three dependent variables: labor-market participation (P ) is a dummy
variable for the individual participating in the labor-market; employment (L) is a
dummy variable for the individual being in employment;12 and finally, log wage per
unit of time (lnw or simply wages hereafter) is the log of annual total income divided
by the number of hours worked per week.13
[Table 2 about here]
10We use alternatively the magisterial district to proxy the neighborhood instead of an interaction
term between the area type (urban or rural) and the magisterial district (See Appendix D). This
change reduces the magnitude of the effect, suggesting that social interactions occur mainly at the
local level as the quality of information decreases with the distance.
114,266 does not equal 278 ∗ 2 ∗ 11 as there are 1850 empty cells.
12An individual is recorded as being active in the Census if he is employed or unemployed. An
individual is recorded as being employed in the Census if he responded “Yes: formal registered
(non-farming)”, “Yes: informal unregistered (non-farming)”, “Yes: farming”, “Yes: has work but
was temporarily absent” to the question “In the seven days before 10 October did (the person) do
any work for PAY (in cash or in kind profit or family gain, for one hour or more?” The Census
attempts to apply UN and ILO standards in defining the unemployed as those who are out of work
and actively seeking a job.
13We do not have information on the number of weeks worked per year, so we cannot compute the
hourly wage, and our regressions may be misspecified if the number of weeks worked per year varies
across individuals. Another limitation is that we cannot decompose income into wages and other
income sources. Our estimates will be biased if non-wage income is correlated with the network.
However, non-wage income is likely small relative to wages, as the average income of non-workers
is less than 5% of that of workers.
10
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Table 2 shows the sample size, and the active and employed population for each
of the 11 language groups. Around 20% of our sample speaks IsiZulu, followed by
IsiXhosa and Afrikaans speakers. Second, workplace behavior differs by language
group. labor-market participation is over 80% for Afrikaans, English and Sesotho
speakers, but under 70% for IsiXhosa speakers. Some language groups are thus over-
represented14 in the workplace (Afrikaans speakers constitute almost 15% of labor-
market participants, 20% of the employed population, but only 13% of the sample)
while others, such as IsiXhosa speakers, are underrepresented (14% of participants,
11% of employed population and 16% of the sample).
The proportion of workers also differs by language groups: while more than
60% of Afrikaans and English speakers work (over 50% of women and over 75% of
men), the employment rate rarely exceeds 40% for IsiNdebele, Sesotho, Setswana
and Siswati speakers, and is even lower for other groups (See Table 2). On average,
only 43% of individuals in the sample are employed, (34% of women and 53% of
men). Women never represent more than 45% of the work force whatever ethnic
group we consider. The female to male ratio and the standard deviations summa-
rize considerable variation in labor-market behavior across individuals by sex and
ethnicity. The gender gap differs widely according to ethnic group: the female to
male ratio varies between 0.73 (Xitsonga-speakers) and 0.87 (Sesotho-speakers) for
the participation rate, and 0.42 (Xitsonga-speakers) and 0.75 (English speakers) for
the employment rate. Moreover, within each gender the standard deviation of the
employment rate fluctuates around 13.28.
Appendix C stresses the potential discrimination against women and some eth-
nic groups with some cautionary notes. We acknowledge the following limitations
of any empirical work about discrimination. Indeed, Altonji & Blank (1999) ar-
gue that estimation of discrimination leads to two biases: discrimination could be
overestimated, due to some unobservables, or underestimated due to pre-market
discrimination (in education for instance). In Appendix C, the Heckman selection
model15 controls for characteristics at the individual and household levels, and adds
dummies for area as fixed effect to minimize these biases. Results show that being
14Over representation means that the size of a language group in the employed population is
bigger than the size in the sample. See Table 2.
15The probability to be employed is estimated only for the active population.
11
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a male, speaking Afrikaans or English increases the probability to be employed. It
confirms that women and some ethnic groups are less integrated in the South African
labor market, as suggested by descriptive statistics.
[Table 3 about here]
Last, individual characteristics are not the same by language group (See Table 3).
Most notably, Afrikaners and English speakers are more educated on average. The
network means by language group for labor-market participation and employment
are called Network1 and Network2, respectively. Xhosa speakers have the lowest
network value for both of our variables of interest. These are followed by Zulu,
Afrikaans and English-speakers for the network in labor-market participation, all
of whom have values under the total mean. For the employment network, Zulu,
Sepedi and Xitsonga-speakers all have low scores. On the contrary, Thsivenda and
Siswati-speakers have the highest network values for labor-market participation and
employment.
The inequalities in individual income between language groups are striking.
Afrikaans- and English-speakers are the richest while Siswati- and Xitsonga-speakers
are the poorest. This difference remains when we carry out the analysis by gender
and is not explained by the number of hours worked, as the poorest work more hours
that do the rich. As such, English- and Afrikaans-speakers record the highest hourly
wage and Siswati- and Xitsonga-speakers the lowest.
4 Empirical strategy
4.1 Empirical framework
We first estimate the probabilities of participation and employment. We assume
that these depend on a set of individual characteristics, local economic conditions
and specific ethnic characteristics. We introduce networks into the models as follows:
Pr (Pihal = 1|Xihal, Ya, Zl) = F (Netwial;Xihal;Ya;Zl; ihal) (2)
Pr (Lihal = 1|Xihal, Ya, Zl) = F (Netwial;Xihal;Ya;Zl; ihal) (3)
12
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where i indexes individuals, h households, a areas and l language groups; Pihal and
Lihal are dummy variables for labor-force participation and employment, respectively.
Netwial is a network variable,
16 Xihal are individual characteristics, Ya geographical
characteristics, Zl ethnic group characteristics and ihal is the error term. As the
network variable is defined using the group mean we cluster errors at the group
level.17
For the model to be empirically tractable, we adopt a linear specification:
Pr (Lihal = 1|Xihal, Ya, Zl) = αNetwial + βXihal + δYa + γZl + ihal (4)
In other specifications, we allow α to vary by gender and ethnic group, and to
be non-linear with respect to the number of potential contacts by using an interac-
tion term. For example, to investigate the gender effect, we estimate the following
equation:
Pr (Lihal = 1|Xihal, Ya, Zl) = α1Netwial+α2Netwial∗Gender+βXihal+δYa+γZl+ihal
(5)
To check the robustness of our results we also estimate equation (4) on sub-
samples defined by gender (See Appendix E) or ethnic group (unreported).
As shown by Manski (1993), the estimation of equation (4) presents a number of
challenges. Manski proposes a useful terminology distinguishing endogenous effects,
exogenous effects and correlated effects. Endogenous effects refer to the impact
of peer behavior on that of the individual. This is what we want measure here,
describing the effect of networks and social norms. Exogenous effects refer to the
impact of the exogenous characteristics of the peers on individual behavior. If my
geographical peers are highly-educated, I may be more likely to work due to human-
capital spillovers. Last, correlated effects reflect that groups and networks are not
formed at random, and that individuals in networks tend to share characteristics
and/or face similar environments. Here it may be the case, if I am working, that I
16The construction of which is described in Section 2.
17If standard errors are not clustered by groups, the accuracy of the results is computed as if
each single individual in a group is an independent observation, although this is not the case. The
unit of observation is the group and clustering standard errors by group accounts for this fact.
13
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like to live with other working people, because we share certain values.
Manski (1993) shows that“naive”regressions run into two problems. First, due to
endogeneity, OLS estimation is biased, as network formation and location decisions
are partly taken on the basis of variables that are unobserved by the econometrician,
and which may be correlated with labor-market outcomes. For example, if talented
people tend to be in contact with each other (but we do not completely observe
talent), there will be a positive network correlation regarding employment status. It
would however be misleading to interpret this as a peer effect, as talent likely has
a positive direct impact on the probability of employment. Second, the model is
plagued by identification problems as there is circular causality between the depen-
dent variable and the covariates: networks favor employment but employment helps
create networks. The consequence is that multiple values of the coefficients fit the
data and the model is not fully identified.
Soetevent (2006) discusses four ways of overcoming these problems, via the use of:
(i) data in which agents are assigned randomly to reference groups; (ii) data where
only a fraction of agents within the group are treated; (iii) functional forms that
explicitly account for inter-group differences by adding group-specific fixed effects;
and (iv) instrumental variables. Given the non-random nature of our data, we
rely on the last two strategies to attenuate the estimated social network bias due
to contextual effects (Contreras et al. (2007)). Nevertheless, instead of using only
the standard instrumental variable estimator (identification strategy No.2), first we
instead appeal to a proxy and replace the local network measure by an aggregated
measure at the province level (identification strategy No.1) and, last, we use the
Hausman & Taylor (1981) instrumental variable technique (identification strategy
No.3).
Moreover, Manski (1993), Araujo et al. (2004) argue that the non-linearity of
the binary choice model allows empirical identification of the peer effect. Only
individuals who cross the threshold between not working and working contribute to
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4.2 Fixed effects as controls for correlated effects
To allow for correlated effects, we add sets of dummies to our model. We first
add a complete set of 278 district dummies, picking up differences in local labor-
market conditions which may act as contextual effects. Dividing the country up into
sufficiently small geographical areas should ensure that we control for local labor
demand. Our model is identified as the peer effect is district times rural/urban times
language group, so that we have variation in peer group labor-market outcomes even
within districts.
In addition, a correlation between individual and group behavior may result from
unobserved group characteristics which affect labor-force participation. Assume for
example that some groups are discriminated against in the labor-market or in schools.
They may then have a lower probability of being employed when looking for work,
or be offered a lower wage so that fewer individuals will look for work. In this
case, any observed correlation cannot be interpreted as a causal impact of individual
behavior. To avoid this problem, we include language-group dummies. In unreported
robustness checks, we also include a dummies for each language/area combination.
We last include a measure of contact availability as a control variable. We do so
because location choice may be correlated with omitted variables which are them-
selves correlated with employment. For example, some workers may be more mobile
and willing to move than others, so that they may uncover job opportunities that
are far from home at the expense of leaving their friends. This might be why this
control has a negative estimated coefficient.
Our empirical model can then be written as:
Lihal = αNetwial + βXihal + δa + γl + ωlnCAal + ihal (6)
where δa and γl are respectively area and language-group dummies (fixed effects).
4.3 Three strategies for the endogeneity problem
4.3.1 Using an aggregated measure of network
Following Bertrand et al. (2000), we replace the local network measure by an
aggregated measure at the province level. This way of aggregating the data at the
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province level avoids the remaining omitted variable bias. Unobserved variables
that are common to a given language group in a given area and correlated with
employment status will produce what look like peer effects. The aggregated network
measure corrects this problem, as it is uncorrelated with the common characteristics
of the local group. Our assumption is that people take the average characteristics of
networks in the province as given. They construct their networks at the magisterial
district level and may even choose their location on the basis of network size or
quality. Nevertheless, we assume that they do not move province in order to benefit




ial + βXihal + δa + γl + ωlnCAal + ihal (7)
where Netwpial is a network measure using average employment at the province in-
stead of the district level:
Netwp(al = ln(CAal)× Lipl) (8)
The pattern of network quality at the province level has to be exogenous with
respect to employment status and conditional on our controls. For example, very
mobile individuals may move between provinces to pick up job opportunities. If
mobility is a characteristic valued by employers, we may find that people located in
provinces offering better networks on average have a greater probability of employ-
ment even though this does not reflect peer effects. To avoid this, we control for
contact availability in all of our specifications.
4.3.2 Using the distribution of the sex of peers’ sibling as IV
We use the standard 2SLS estimator and the distribution of the sex of peers’
sibling as instrumental variable. This paper assumes that South African households
have son-preferences or diversity’-preferences. Angrist & Evans (1998), Maurin &
Moschion (2009) show evidence on the positive correlation between the sex of the
18To test the robustness of our results, we use the mean of active or working individuals of the
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oldest siblings and the final number of children of a household in US and France,
respectively. Thus, the participation of an individual in the labor market Lihal is
influenced by the sex of his/her oldest siblings because parents having same-sex
children (denote SS19) tend to have more children.
Lihal = F (SSihal, Xihal) (9)
Appendix F presents the correlation coefficient between having same-sex chil-
dren and the total number of children, the probability to be active, employed, the
proportion of peers having same-sex children and the neighborhood respectively. It
suggests that the distribution of the sex of peers’ sibling is a valid instrumental vari-
able, correlated with the total number of children, the labor-market behaviour and
uncorrelated with the neighborhood choice. This means that having two girls or two
boys encourage to have a third child, that decreases both the probabilities to be ac-
tive and employed (Rosenzweig & Wolpin (2000)). Among household with same-sex
siblings, the employment rate is about 47.50%. This is about 1 point lower than
among household with different-sex siblings (46.65%). Maurin & Moschion (2009)
on French data and Angrist & Evans (1998) on US data find the same stylised facts
with a higher magnitude than in South Africa.
In contrast, the sex of the oldest siblings does not have any perceptible influence
on neighborhood choices: no correlation between the sex of the siblings of an indi-
vidual and the sex of the siblings of the other individuals living in the same close
neighborhood. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude that the sex of children does not
influence the neighborhood choice. Indeed, having same-sex children increases the
probability to have a third child and then to need a bigger house. If the size of
the dwelling is correlated with the neighborhood localization, we can suppose that
household having same-sex children tend to be concentrate in some neighborhood.
However, we do not observe any concentration of household having same-sex sib-
lings in the local ethnic group (See Appendix F). Assuming no correlation between
the sex of the siblings of an individual and the sex of the siblings of the other in-
dividuals living in the same close neighborhood speaking the same language, i.e.
19SS = 1 if the two oldest children of an individual have the same sex.
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E(SSial|SSial) = 0, our empirical strategy is:
Lihal = αN̂etwial + βXihal + δa + γl + ωlnCAal + ihal (10)
where
N̂etwial = F (SSal)
20 (11)
4.3.3 Using a quasi-panel data approach
Our last identification strategy consists to adopt a quasi-panel data approach.
This methodology introduced by Graham & Hahn (2005) allows identification of peer
effects in a linear-in-means model. The number of observed local ethnic groups are
treated as cross-sectional dimension and the number of sampled individuals within
each local ethnic groups as time-series dimension.
Using a quasi-panel data approach justifies the use of Hausman & Taylor (1981)
instrumental variable technique developed for panel data models. Those instruments
generate exogenous between-group variations which create extra information and
allow the social multiplier identification (Graham & Hahn (2005)).
Identification is obtained by combining the sources of instruments suggested by
Hausman & Taylor (1981) with fixed effects to control for the contextual effects.
The Hausman-Taylor estimator provides consistent and efficient estimates of the
coefficient associated with singly exogenous individual-invariant variables, despite
the absence of external instruments. This approach provides two source of instru-
ments: (i) group means of exogenous variables and (ii) deviation from groups means
of individual characteristics. Indeed, the deviations from local ethnic group means
of all Xihal are uncorrelated with the group-level error term by construction. This
approach requires more explanatory variables without contextual effects than corre-
lated variables for identification (Knight & Gunatilaka (2009)). Thus, the means of
these variables (age, age squared, gender, marital status) and the mean deviations
of all explanatory variables are used as instrumental variables.
20The mean is computed excluding the individual and the household members.
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4.4 Heckman
We estimate a Heckman selection model to see whether our measure of networks
influences wages. Only individuals who have a job have a wage, therefore we can
only test for peer effects on wages in the subsample of the employed.
However, this estimation will suffer from selection bias if unobservable or omitted
characteristics in the selection equation contribute to the determination of wages.
The sample of individuals participating in the labor-market may thus contain in-
dividuals with specific characteristics correlated with wages which are included in
the error term . Hence, the impact of observed individual characteristics Xi is
mis-estimated.
We thus estimate the probability of having a job in a first stage, which yields
the Inverse Mills Ratio (see Equation 12). In the second step, wages are estimated
including this Inverse Mills Ratio (see Equation 13). However, identification in the
second equation is based on the nonlinearity of the Mills ratio. If the variation in the
individual characteristics is only small, the wage equation will exhibit considerable
collinearity and therefore imprecise estimates. The first equation (selection equation)
should thus contain one or more additional explanatory variables that do not figure
in the second equation (Vi: the additional identifying constraints). In our model, one
excluded variable is introduced into the employment equation: a dummy variable
for the individual being a homeowner, insofar as ownership influences behavior on
the labor-market by determining individual mobility. Oswald (1996) suggests that
workers are less likely to move if they own a house.
The following system is thus estimated using the instrument:21
L = N̂etw + βX + νVi + δa + γl + ωlnCA+  (12)
lnW = αN̂etw + βX + δa + γl + ωlnCA+ ρλ+  if L = 1 (13)
where λ is the Inverse Mills Ratio which corrects for selection bias, L stands for
employment, lnW the log of wages and Vi the additional identifying constraints.
21Subscripts are omitted for clarity.
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5 Results
5.1 Peer effects as a social norm
In our first specification, we estimate a probit model with robust clustered stan-
dard errors for labor-force participation. Table 4 presents the estimation results
using the aggregate data strategy to deal with endogeneity problems. Fixed effects
for language groups and areas are also included to deal with simultaneity problems.
The right-hand side includes socio-demographic controls, our measure of networks
and a measure of contact availability. The socio-demographic controls include a
gender dummy, four education dummies, age and age-squared, the number of chil-
dren at home, five dummies for marital status, and the number of individuals in the
household who participate in the labor market.
The socio-demographic controls attract the expected signs: higher education and
being a man with few children increase the probability of participation. Experience
and age both have non-linear effects. Contact availability attracts a negative coef-
ficient in the regressions. One interpretation is that motivated people are willing
to move away from their peers in order to obtain a job. As such, this control suc-
cessfully screens out some of the unobservable individual characteristics that could
have biased our estimates. Finally, the number of other working household mem-
bers attracts a positive and significant sign. This likely reflects omitted household
variables that are correlated with employment: for example, wealth, pressure from
family members or common attitudes toward work.
[Table 4 about here]
Regarding peer effects on labor-force participation, network measure attracts a
positive and significant coefficient whatever the identification strategy used (See Ta-
ble 4, column (1) for the first identification strategy, Table 5 for the second one and
6 for the last one). This implies that the more peers participate in the labor-market,
the higher is the individual probability of participation. This can be interpreted as
social pressure to participate from peers. This norm of participation describes social
behavior conveyed by society and internalized by individuals in the process of their
socialization through peers. In developing countries, where community laws domi-
nate individual laws, men and women respect these constraints (Coleman (1990)).
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Therefore, individuals surrounded by active peers may have an additional incentive
to look for a job via social pressure. This is consistent with Clark (2003), who finds
that own unemployment is more painful when surrounding peers are working. The
elasticity of the participation probability with respect to our network measure is
0.2922
[Table 5 about here]
However, this is only a “first-order” figure that does not take into account any
snowball effects. If we assume that the snowball effect acts as a geometric sequence,
the additional effect on activity of a one percent exogenous increase in local activity
is:
1
1− CA× α − 1
which is equal to 0.4. The reality is probably somewhere in between these two
extremes. It is unrealistic to assume that there is no “snowball effect”, but also to
think that this social multiplier always works until the full effect is obtained. As
such we can interpret these figures as upper and lower bounds.
[Table 6 about here]
Table 4 includes an interaction term with sex and provides evidence of gendered
peer effects (column (2)):23 on average, the participation peer effect is higher for
women. However, it is worth going deeper here. When we distinguish the gendered
peer effect by ethnicity, Afrikaans- and English-speakers stand out with a stronger
peer effect for men than for women, while this is inversed in other ethnic groups.
[Table 7 about here]
The gender effect is considerable with a non-linear specifications (See Figure 1).24
Table 7 presents the first results about non-linearity. It suggests that network have
non-linear return. The size of our database allows to go beyond this simple relation
22The average value of CA is 1.51: the net peer effect is then computed as 0.194× 1.51 = 0.292.
23We can test the robustness of these results using female sub-samples: this does not change the
size or significance of the coefficients.
24These results are consistent with previous research providing some evidence of non-linearities
in social interactions (Clark & Loheac (2007)).
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and to analyze the network effect according to the size of the network. Thus, the
network coefficient is computed here for each five-percent block of contact avail-
ability. This exercise confirms that peer effects are non-linear and gender-specific
(suggested by Table 7): the coefficients are significant and fall with contact avail-
ability for women but rise for men. There is thus concave and convex social pressure
for women and men, respectively, regarding labor-force participation. While the
first contacts have a significant influence on women’s participation, this is true only
after a certain threshold for men. Thus the gender gap is considerable for the first
contacts and falls with the number of available contacts. The convexity of the peer
effect on participation suggests the possibility of multiple equilibria. When few men
participate to the labor market, additional participation has little effect and men
may remain stuck in an inactivity trap as the snowball effect fails to occur. However,
as the network grows, the peer effect gets higher, enabling the possibility of a second
equilibrium in which the participation rate is substantially higher. This is not true
for women. Even small networks have a huge marginal effects on participation.
Finally, Figure 2 depicts the heterogeneity between ethnic groups: among women,
the social pressure is lower for those who have higher network quality, while for men,
it is lower for those who have a larger network.
5.2 Peer effects as a matching device
If peer effects work only via social norms, we would expect wages to fall with
the number of working peers, as the labor demand curve should not move. In this
section, we ask whether peer effects also improve job search and matching. We
estimate therefore the impact of networks on employment and wages.
5.2.1 Employment
As in the previous section, a probit model with robust clustered standard errors
was estimated for employment (see equation (7)) including fixed effects25 and control
variables. The results of our most basic specification are shown in the first column
of Table 8. As in the previous section, the control variables have the expected
sign. All else equal, men and those living in urban areas have a higher probability
25These are sets of dummies for language groups and areas.
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of having a job. The number of children has a positive sign but the direction of
causality is unclear. Children may provide additional incentives to work, or may
reduce the reservation wage because of the need for additional resources to bring
them up. Alternatively, individuals may have fewer children when they lack financial
resources.
There are sizeable peer effects regarding the probability of employment: as the
number of working peers increases, the individual probability of working rises with
an elasticity of 0.43. The results remain whatever the strategy used (See Tables 5
and 6). This confirms that working peers are important in helping individuals to
find a job (Granovetter (1974, 1995)). Since peer effects occur via networks, working
peers can be considered as channels of information transmission between network
members. Working peers can thus help to reduce information asymmetries and
statistical discrimination, since firms base their hiring decisions on average rather
than individual productivity (Arrow (1971), Phelps (1972)). Moreover, job offers
can be obtained from direct and indirect acquaintances, through word-of-mouth
communication (de Mart´ı & Zenou (2009)). By reducing employer uncertainty about
worker productivity, networks may enhance the matching between job-seekers and
available jobs (Marsden & Gorman (2001)).
[Table 8 about here]
Second, column (2) of Table 8 displays the coefficients estimated separately for
men and women. The effect is slightly (and significantly) higher for men, which
suggests that networks have a higher return for men. This overall correlation hides
some non-linearities, as revealed in Figure 3. The “network gap” is very large at the
bottom end of the distribution, but the estimated coefficients become much smaller
and closer to each other as the number of potential contacts increases.26 Men with
few contacts have high returns to networks, so that even a few contacts can make
a considerable difference. This is also true for women but to a lesser extent. Table
7 suggests a decreasing return to networks for both men and women, confirmed by
Figure 3. These results suggest that a small network is much better that no network
26Our specification does not allow us to use quantiles based on the distribution of L because
of reflexivity, i.e. the quantile would depend on the endogenous variable. By doing so, we would
mix together individuals with a low return to networks and those who have a low probability of
employment for other reasons.
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at all as the marginal effect is quite high for people with few contacts. Therefore,
finding ways to help isolated individuals to build networks is a matter of public
policy and may be quite efficient to fight poverty.
Finally, Figure 4 shows the different effects by language group and gender. The
peer effect on the probability of working is significantly lower for English- and
Afrikaans-speakers among women, and for English-speakers among men. The ethnic
groups which are the most integrated27 on the labor market thus have the small-
est peer effects. English- and Afrikaans-speaking women are overrepresented on
the labor force: they represent respectively 7.41% and 12.73% of the sample, but
13.91% and 20.36% of the labor force. Despite their labor-market presence, their
peer effect elasticity is about 0.23 and 0.37 respectively, as against 0.41 for women
on average We interpret this as a selection effect. Unemployment is explained by
individual characteristics and characteristics that are common to the whole group.
Conditional on a belonging to a group that is better integrated in the labor mar-
ket, unemployment is associated with worse individual characteristics. Those who
belong to ‘good’ groups, have ‘worse’ individual characteristics when unemployed.
Therefore, in better-integrated groups networks are likely to be less effective.
5.2.2 Wages
We estimate the effect of networks on wages using a two-step Heckman model
to correct for selection bias. The same specification as above is applied. We add
dummy variables for employment and industry, and the distribution of the sex of
peers’ sibling and home ownership are used as exclusion variables.
Most of the estimated coefficients are unsurprising. As before, the effect of age is
positive and concave. Wages are positively associated with education, being a man,
the number of children and having other people working in the household.
Once again, peer effects are positive, large and significant, as shown in Table 9.
This is important because it shows that peer effects are not restricted to the labor
supply curve. There are three explanations for this result. First, it is possible that
networks improve matching. If productivity is firm-specific, a large network can help
individuals to maximize wages over the set of firms. Second, if networks reduce the
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cost of effort in job search, they may increase the reservation wage. Third, in a
labor market with imperfect information about worker productivity, networks can
be used to signal ability. In such a game involving one employer and one worker, a
third party can put its reputation at stake and produce a signal regarding worker
productivity. If the worker turns out to have low productivity, the reputation of the
third party will suffer, so that the employer will trust the signal less.
[Table 9 about here]
This can be related to the finding that men benefit slightly less from peers than
do women. Women workers will benefit more from peers if the variation in their pro-
ductivity is larger, as the larger is this variation the more valuable are productivity
signals. This is consistent with the variance in our wage measure being higher for
women (1.352) than for men (1.336). This observation is robust to a decomposition
by language group (see Figure 5).
The peer effect on wages is concave for both sexes (see Figure 6). The marginal
value of additional peers is decreasing: having a small network instead of no network
greatly increases the odds of finding a better-paid job, but having a large network
instead of a small one only slightly increases the average wage.
Again, Afrikaans- and English-speaking individuals have the lowest peer effect,
in contrast with their active presence on the labor-market relative to other language
groups.
5.3 Robustness checks
Table 10 shows how the network coefficient varies across subsamples. This sec-
tion checks whether our results are driven by sample characteristics. Since 20% of
our sample are IsiZulu speakers (see Table 3), we check to see if our results are
driven by this group. In row 2, the peer effects remain positive and significant for
the three dependent variables (labor-market participation, Employment and Wages)
when IsiZulu speakers are excluded. The gender effect remains significant and of the
same sign as above.
We also exclude the overrepresented groups in the labor-market identified in
Table 3, namely Afrikaans- and English-speakers, in rows 3 and 4 respectively. The
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peer effect stays positive and significant for the three dependent variables. The
gender effect also remains, apart from when we exclude Afrikaans speakers in the
wage equation. These exercises confirm the robustness of our results and suggest
that having a higher quality or size of network does not affect the existence of the
peer effect.
[Table 10 about here]
Whatever the sample analysed, the peer effects remain positive and significant.
In row 5, we only include individuals with children: the coefficients remain positive
and significant. In row 6, we restrict our sample to individuals aged between 25 and
40 so as to focus on the cohort that is the most likely to be active and to begin
their career. The coefficient falls for labor-force participation, suggesting that social
pressure increases with age.
In unreported robustness checks, we distinguish the network effect according to
the gender and the ethnic group of an individual in sub-samples. The results remain
unchanged: the peer effects on labor-force participation and wages are higher for
females, whereas that on employment is higher for males (in all ethnic group); ethnic
membership determines the magnitude of the peer effect. Moreover, alternative
measures of contact availability (ln(sal+1) instead of ln(
sal
sl
+1)) and group definition
(by area, language and gender) yield similar results.
6 Policy implications and concluding remarks
In this paper, we assess the presence of peer effects on the South African labor
market. For a given individual, the number of peers who participate in the labor-
market (resp. have a job) influences the decision to participate (resp. labor-market
outcomes). A one percent increase in the proportion of working peers raises the
probability of participation and the odds of finding a job by over 30% and has a
substantial effect on wages. Social interactions seem to be an additional determinant
of employment along the same lines as education and experience. These findings
suggest the presence of two mechanisms on the labor market. First, the fact that
participation is not independent of peers’ decisions shows that social norms or social
pressures are at work. Being surrounded by active peers provides social incentives
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to look for a job. The decision to look for a job is conditioned by others’ behavior.
This externality may generate multiple equilibria, some with high employment and
others with low employment. This is a plausible explanation for the considerable
variance of average employment between ethnic groups.
Second, networks seem to be a useful tool during job search, increasing wages
and the probability of finding a job. The unique feature of networks is that they
allow individuals to signal their productivity and overcome market failures tied to
asymmetric information. If individual i suggests to employer j that he should recruit
worker k, he puts his reputation at stake. If the workers turns out to have low
productivity, the employer will no longer trust i’s suggestions. This mechanism
provides incentives to i to signal k’s productivity as best as he can.
Networks seem to be more efficient for language groups that are not well inte-
grated in the labor market. Peer effects are much lower for Afrikaans- and English-
speaking individuals, although these groups are largely overrepresented on the labor
market. This suggests that networks may be a tool to reduce economic inequalities
between ethnic groups.
Another implication is that peer effects create social multipliers. Employment
shocks can be amplified by a considerable amount (elasticity between 0.3 and 0.5).
It is important for political purposes as the snowball effect due to social interaction
within local ethnic groups amplifies the extent of labor-market policies. The effect
of affirmative action focusing on the reduction of discrimination and labor-market
inequality between ethnic group or gender cold be amplified by networks.
Moreover, recent research in labor economics has emphasized the key role of the
matching process. We argue that networks are central to the efficiency of this process
and greatly increase the rate at which vacant jobs are filled in addition to shortening
unemployment spells.
Finally, spatial segregation may, in fact, play an economic role. Our results
suggest that peer effects are strong within each local ethnic group, so that it is
easier to build networks when surrounded by people from the same ethnic group.
Under this assumption, spatial segregation is a way of maximizing information flows
when labor-market institutions do not fulfill this role.
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7 Tables and Figures
Table 1: The maximum concentration rate in provinces by language group
language Concentration rate Province
IsiNdebele 49.09 Mpumalanga
IsiXhosa 58.45 Eastern Cape
IsiZulu 64.48 KwaZulu-Natal
Sepedi 55.42 Limpopo
Sesotho 44.19 Free State




Afrikaans 44.36 Western Cape
English 31.08 Gauteng
The ethnic group is significantly correlated with the province (0.5***) and the area (0.52***).
Table 2: Labor-market representation by language group.
% in S. % in A. % in E. Act. rate Emp. rate Repr.
Afrikaans 13.16 14.05 19.76 80.39 64.36 1.50
English 7.66 8.44 13.23 82.96 74.05 1.73
IsiNdebel 1.93 1.96 1.83 76.47 40.51 0.95
IsiXhosa 16.03 14.84 11.57 69.67 30.93 0.72
IsiZulu 20.79 20.08 15.83 72.70 32.64 0.76
Sepedi 9.83 9.46 8.76 72.49 38.20 0.89
Sesotho 9.19 9.88 9.02 80.91 42.07 0.98
Setswana 10.40 10.51 10.10 76.03 41.62 0.97
Siswati 3.07 3.07 2.89 75.27 40.39 0.94
Tshivenda 2.50 2.43 2.17 73.43 37.34 0.87
Xitsonga 5.44 5.28 4.84 73.06 38.17 0.89
S. A. and E. refers to the size of each language group in the sample, in active
and employed population respectively. Repr. refers to the labor-market
representation of each language group (%inE./%inS.).
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Table 4: Peer effects as social norms















Primary Education 0.040*** 0.040***
(23.00) (23.07)
Secondary Education 0.133*** 0.133***
(57.33) (57.41)
Tertiary Education 0.156*** 0.156***
(36.90) (36.90)





Columns (1) and (2) present the marginal effects. Dummies for language groups and areas are
included as fixed effects. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Contact availability refers to ln(CAal) as specified in the
text. Network refers to Netwpial = ln(CAal)×Li,pl as specified in the text. HH refers to the number
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Table 5: Instrument for Netwial: son preference or ’diversity’ preference
Second Stage Labor Market Participation Employment
Network 0.294*** 0.391***
(3.35) (4.72)
Gender*Network - 0.082*** 0.063***
(24.12) (24.12)
Observations 840016 840016
R squared 0.19 0.28
First Stage Network1 Network2





Dummies for language groups and areas are included as fixed effects. Absolute value of z-statistics in
parentheses for the 2SLS and t-statistics for the first stage. *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1%
level. Network1 (Network2 resp.) refers to Netwial = ln(CAal)× P ial (Netwial = ln(CAal)× Lial
resp.) as specified in the text.
Table 6: Hausman-Taylor estimator




Number of group 3446 3446
Dummies for language groups and areas are included as fixed effects. Absolute value of z-statistics in
parentheses *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Network refers to Netwial = ln(CAal)×
Lial as specified in the text. Variables used as instruments are: distributions of the sex of the first
and the two oldest siblings of peers; the means of these instruments: age, age squared, gender,
marital status; and the mean deviations of all explanatory variables.
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Table 7: Non-linear peer effects













*, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Absolute value of t-statistics in
parentheses.
























Contact availability is calculated by 20 five-percentile groups.
Dummies for language groups and areas are included as fixed ef-
fects. All coefficients are significant at the 5% or 1% level. Net
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Primary Education 0.035*** 0.035***
(11.19) (11.08)
Secondary Education 0.224*** 0.223***
(53.60) (53.68)
Tertiary Education 0.406*** 0.406***
(38.71) (38.72)





Columns (1) and (2) present the marginal effects. Dummies for language groups and areas are
included as fixed effects. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Contact availability refers to ln(CAal) as specified in the
text. Network refers to Netwpial = ln(CAal)×Lipl as specified in the text. HH refers to the number
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Primary Education 0.253*** 0.253***
(42.42) (42.55)
Secondary Education 0.982*** 0.982***
(90.19) (89.94)
Tertiary Education 1.654*** 1.654***
(53.80) (53.96)







Dummies for language groups and areas are included as fixed effects. Absolute value of t-statistics
in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Contact availability
refers to ln(CAal) as specified in the text. Network refers to Netw
p
ial = ln(CAal)×Lipl as specified
in the text. Wage refers to the log of the ratio of yearly income to weekly hours worked. Estimations
are carried out using the Heckman selection model; the distribution of the sex of peers’ sibling and
a dummy variable for home ownership are included as an exclusion restrictions. Additional control
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Table 10: Robustness checks
Labor Force Participation Employment Wage
1) Original sample Networkpial 0.201*** 0.263*** 0.259***
(14.68) (12.55) (23.19)
Gender*Networkpial -0.021*** 0.052*** -0.013*
(2.88) (3.99) (1.88)
2) IsiZulu speakers excluded Networkpial 0.198*** 0.258*** 0.286***
(12.70) (11.37) (24.51)
Gender*Networkpial -0.032*** 0.037*** -0.029***
(4.35) (2.61) (4.08)
2) Afrikaans speakers excluded Networkpial 0.181*** 0.242*** 0.2111***
(14.66) (9.67) (15.42)
Gender*Networkpial -0.013* 0.050*** 0.004***
(1.76) (3.08) (3.56)
2) English speakers excluded Networkpial 0.193*** 0.316*** 2.777***
(15.72) (15.18) (21.56)
Gender*Networkpial -0.022*** 0.021* -0.025***
(3.67) (1.86) (3.09)
3) With children Networkpial 0.215*** 0.255*** 0.148***
(13.57) (12.09) (9.64)
Gender*Networkpial -0.018** 0.045*** -0.033***
(2.00) (3.38) (3.65)
4) 25/40 years old Networkpial 0.166*** 0.265*** 0.244***
(33.60) (42.36) (15.35)
Gender*Networkpial -0.018*** 0.020*** -0.051***
(10.88) (5.29) (5.39)
Absolute value of z and t statistics in parentheses for (a) and (b) respectively. * significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dummies for language groups and areas are included as
fixed effects. Wage refers to the log of the ratio of yearly income to weekly hours worked. Standard
errors are clustered at the group level. (a) Estimations are carried out using a probit model. (b)
Estimations are carried out using the Heckman selection model.
Figure 2: Peer effects in labor-force participation by language and gender
 
Dummies for language groups and areas are included as fixed ef-
fects. All coefficients are significant at the 5% or 1% level. Net
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Contact availability is calculated by 20 five-percentile groups.
Dummies for language groups and areas are included as fixed ef-
fects. All coefficients are significant at the 5% or 1% level. Net
effects (α ∗ lnCA) are presented. Standard errors are clustered at
the group level.
Figure 4: Peer effects in employment by language and gender
 
Dummies for language groups and areas are included as fixed ef-
fects. All coefficients are significant at the 5% or 1% level. Net
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Figure 5: Peer effects in wages by language and gender
 
Dummies for language groups and areas are included as fixed ef-
fects. All coefficients are significant at the 5% or 1% level. Net
effects (α ∗ lnCA) are presented. Estimations are carried out using
the Heckman selection model. Standard errors are clustered at the
group level.


























Contact availability is calculated by 20 five-percentile groups.
Dummies for language groups and areas are included as fixed ef-
fects. All coefficients are significant at the 5% or 1% level. Net
effects (α ∗ lnCA) are presented. Standard errors are clustered at
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Appendix
A Methods taken to find current job
Table 11: Methods taken to find current job
%
A friend/relative (in a different household) 40.72
Saw an advert in the newspaper 11.86
I knocked on factory gates and visited 8.68
I went to a factory and waited for a job 7.85
A household member told me about the job 7.18
Saw an advert on a notice board 5.46
I asked someone who had employed me before 4.21
Through an employment agency 2.63
I waited on the side of the road 1.98
Contacted by employer 1.14
n.a 8.3
Source: South African National Income Dynamycs Study
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C Labor-Market Discrimination
Table 12: Labor-Market Discrimination

























Speaking Afrikaans is omitted. Dummies for areas are included as fixed effects.
Additional controls are age, age squared, education, number of children, urban
dummy, household characteristics, lnCA, religion dummies, household type
dummies and socio-professional category of wife or husband. Estimations are
carried out using the Heckman selection model. Absolute value of t-statistics
in parentheses. *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level.
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Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dummies for language groups and areas are
included as fixed effects. Estimations are carried out using a probit model.
E Gender sub-sample
Table 14: Gender sub-sample results
Labour Market Participation Employment
Women Men Women Men
Network 0.219*** 0.114*** 0.209*** 0.319***
(12.29) (10.68) (10.48) (14.77)
lnCA1 -0.161*** -0.089*** -0.099*** -0.162***
(11.96) (11.16) (11.72) (17.24)
HH 0.087*** 0.055*** 0.068*** 0.093***
(32.69) (37.83) (27.01) (37.62)
Children -0.018*** -0.002*** -0.010*** 0.012***
(31.38) (4.34) (11.87) (12.07)
Observations 906237 789704 906237 789704
Dummies for language groups and areas are included as fixed effects. Absolute value of z-statistics
in parentheses *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Network refers to Netwial =
ln(CAal) × Lial as specified in the text. Variables used as instruments are: distributions of the
sex of the first and the two oldest siblings of peers; the means of these instruments: age, age
squared, gender, marital status; and the mean deviations of all explanatory variables.
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F Correlation between labor-market behaviour and
the sex of oldest siblings
Table 15: Correlation
Having same-sex children
N. of children 0.2250***
Labor-Market Participation -0.1891***
Employment -0.2062***
Peers having same-sex children 0.00849
Neighborhood -0.0061
*** significant at the 1% level.
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